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POLITICAL QUESTIONS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW:
A COMPARISON
KISABURO YOKOTA*
INTRODUCTION
Japanese courts prior to the 1946 Constitution did not have the
power of judicial review. The concept of a governmental act being
unconstitutional and subsequently reviewable by a court was simply
not a part of either the governmental structure or the Meiji Constitu-
tion.1 This power was first given to the courts by the new postwar
Constitution.2 In Article 81 it provides:
The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine
the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation, or official act.
Although the power of judicial review is granted in unmistakable
terms, Japanese courts have proceeded with great caution and dis-
cretion in their exercise of the power. One aspect of the Japanese
courts' caution is illustrated by its use of the political question doc-
trine. Under this doctrine the judicial branch recognizes the validity
of determinations of the political branches and does not review them
to see whether they conform to the Constitution.' The rationale is that
the Constitution itself places some questions solely under the com-
petence of the political branches of the government.
* Former Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Japan.
This English version of the article was redrafted and substantially supplemented
by the joint work of Hiroshi Itoh, Ph.D. candidate, University of Washington, Politi-
cal Science Department, and E. Charles Routh, Articles Editor, Washington Law
Review.
'See K. TFakayanagi, A Century of Innovation: The Development of Japanese
Law, 1868-1961, in LAW IN JAPAN 5, 6 (A. von Mehren ed. 1963) ; M. t6, The Ride
of Law: Constitutional Development, in LAW IN JAPAN 205, 238 n.108 (A. von
Mehren ed. 1963).
Professor Toshiyoshi Miyazava in his prewar writings was the first to introduce in
Japan the notion of t~chi koi (an act of government) using the French law concepts
as his model. The underlying theories and types of cases involving the act of gov-
ernment which Miyazawa expounded from French law had little, if any, utilization
in actual judicial decision-making and aroused almost no interest in the doctrine
among other jurists. See note 78 infra.
See also J. MAKI, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN xvii (1964) [hereinafter
cited as MAKI].
'See Maki at xix.
'For a jurisprudential analysis of the concept of the political question, viewed
largely from the perspective of United States experience, see generally C. POST, THE
SUPREME COURT AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS (1936) and Frank, Political Questions
in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW (E. Cahn ed. 1954). For a more comparative
study see Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question-A Functional Analysis,
75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966).
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The Japanese Supreme Court has utilized this theory of the political
question, apparently based in part on American and European experi-
ence, and has tended to refuse to review cases presenting "political
questions."4 Since the Japanese courts have only recently had the
power of judicial review, they have not yet clearly established a policy
of what constitutes a political question or when, if ever, such a case
will be reviewed.
Also, unlike American decisions, Japanese decisions rarely express
the underlying policies within the text of the opinion. In Japanese
Supreme Court decisions, however, a policy on judicial review is often
tacitly recognized; the opinions by judges supplementing the Court's
opinion may explicitly contain such a recognition.
The Japanese use of political question doctrine can best be viewed
against the backdrop of American experience with a similar doctrine.
Such a comparison has at least two advantages.' First, the Japanese
Court is obviously aware of developments in this area in both Ameri-
can and European jurisprudence.' Consequently discussion of the
American experience may show how the Japanese Court has adopted
western concepts of the political question or act of state.
But perhaps more significantly such discussion will provide a touch-
stone for a comparative study of the differences in the two countries'
utilization of the doctrine which reflect different attitudes on, and
functional distinctions in the procedure of, judicial review, as well as
changes resulting from the different governmental structures. During
the subsequent case development of the political question doctrine in
the two legal systems certain themes should be kept in mind.
Japan is a unitary, not a federal, state. As a consequence, the com-
plex weave of judicial interrelationships attendant to federal system
in the United States is unknown in Japan. Also there is little need for
distinctions between review of local or regional governmental actions
and review of national governmental actions. Further, Japan as a uni-
Most Japanese scholars and judges use the terms "seiji mondai" (political ques-
tion) and "tochi koi" (act of government) interchangeably. The latter term is vir-
tually synonymous with the German words "Hoheitsakt" and "Regierungsakt" and
the French "acte de gouvernement." For the sake of uniformity and consistency, the
term "political question" will be used throughout. However, as will be apparent, the
term does not correspond to, in all particulars, "political question" as used in Ameri-
can jurisprudence.
Such a use of foreign doctrine, while helpful for comparative purposes, should
not obscure the underlying complexities of Japanese law as a uniquely Japanese
institution arising from the structural development of contemporary Japanese political
and social life.
"See discussion in text at note 76 infra.
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tary state obviously does not have an equivalent of the Guarantee
Clause. Thus the whole area of Guarantee Clause issues, considered
political questions in the United States, has no equivalent in Japanese
law.
Second, Japan's parliamentary form of government dictates a dif-
ferent structure of national government. The American emphasis on
the coequal and coordinate branches of the national government is not
fully duplicated in Japan. The executive branch in Japan is separate
from but subordinate to the Diet. Thus Article 66, paragraph 3 of the
Japanese Constitution states that the Cabinet, in the exercise of execu-
tive power, "shall be collectively responsible to the Diet." The concept
of legislative supremacy is rather clearly stated in Article 41, which
provides that the National Diet "shall be the highest organ of state
power." The inevitable tension between this Article and Article 81,
ensuring judicial review, is implicit in many of the Japanese Supreme
Court's decisions involving the political question doctrine.
A third consideration is a functional analysis of the procedural
techniques of judicial review. The United States Supreme Court has
developed over a period of time a substantial arsenal of techniques for
limiting, at the Court's discretion, the cases which it decides. Denial of
certiorari, lack of substantial federal question or a failure to satisfy
the multitude of jurisdictional requirements all can act as discretion-
ary checks on the Court's calendar. The jjkoku appeal does not pro-
vide similar flexibility.7 An obvious question which must be considered
is the extent to which the political question doctrine in Japan fulfills
a broader functional purpose than the political question doctrine in the
United States.'
I. THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE
Unlike the Japanese Constitution, the United States Constitution
does not expressly provide for judicial review. But the principle of
judicial review was asserted by the Supreme Court early in American
"For a discussion of the uses and limitations of the various appeal procedures
available to the Japanese litigant see MAKI at xxiv.
' There is some authority for the view that where there is an ombudsman or its
functional equivalent, the courts are under less pressure to review what might be
considered a political question. Consequently, the ombudsman where present, may
fulfill some of the functional work of the courts. Conversely the courts may be more
ready to classify a dispute as a political question when the citizen has redress available
through the ombudsman system. See W. GELLORN, OMBUDSMAN AND OTHaERS 372-
419 (1966). Gellhorn points out that the inadequacies of the Japanese formal review
mechanisms have led to an increasing use of other, more informal, techniques for
redress of grievances.
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constitutional history. In Marbury v. Madison,' Chief Justice Mar-
shall held unconstitutional an act of Congress which purported to
enlarge the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.
Having enunciated the principle of judicial review, the Court indi-
cated some possible limitations on it. The Court said: "Questions in
their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, sub-
mitted to the executive, can never be made in this court."" But aside
from its reference to the executive's constitutionally vested political
power, the Marbury Court neither articulated a fully developed theory
of the "political question" nor the way in which it limited judicial
review.
In subsequent cases involving "political questions," the Court
seemed to reason that it had no power (in the sense that it lacked
Article III jurisdiction) to entertain such questions. For example, in
Luther v. Borden" the Court decided that it was confronted with a
political question and must defer to the judgment of the political
department. The issue before the Court was which of two governments
in Rhode Island was legitimate. The Court determined that this issue
presented a political question because: (1) the political branch of
government had always determined whether proposed constitutions
were ratified by the people, and (2) the Constitution expressly author-
ized Congress to suppress insurrection. 2 The Court emphasized the
express language in the Constitution delegating power to Congress and
seemed to conclude that the power of Congress was exclusive and,
therefore, the Court had no power to review Congress' determination.
In a more recent case, Colegrove v. Green" Mr. Justice Frank-
furter reasoned that cases of a political nature "ask this Court what is
beyond its competence to grant." He said that "verbal fencing about
'jurisdiction' " was inappropriate when deciding if something were
"of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for judicial
determination."' 4 After examining the issue of legislative apportion-
ment involved in Colegrove, Frankfurter concluded that the question
was not justiciable because the Court was incapable of fashioning
affirmative relief, the Constitution vested exclusive control of such
matters in Congress, and historically the matter was one left to the
95 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
'
0 Id. at 170.
"48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
12 Id. at 42.
" 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
,Id. at 552.
[ VOL. 43 : 1031
POLITICAL QUESTIONS
political branch.15 In the Frankfurter formulation the constitutional
exclusivity argument became one factor in determining whether an
issue was political, whereas in Luther v. Borden the exclusivity argu-
ment may have been the sole determining factor.
In Baker v. Carr,"6 a subsequent reapportionment case, the Supreme
Court of the United States finally articulated with some clarity its
political question doctrine. Recognizing that it was the "ultimate inter-
preter of the Constitution," the Court proceeded to isolate the factors
it would use to determine on a case-by-case basis whether an issue
was political in nature and thus not justiciable. Emphasizing that the
"non-justiciability of a political question is primarily a function of
the separation of powers"' 7 the Court isolated five categories of cases
in which the political question issue is commonly confronted: (1) for-
eign relations; (2) dates of duration of hostilities; (3) validity of
enactments; (4) status of Indian tribes, and (5) republican form of
government. 18 "Political question" cases in these categories contained
on their face one or more of the following elements: (a) a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political branch; (b) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; (c) the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial dis-
cretion; (d) the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; (e) an unusual need for unquestioning ad-
herence to a political decision already made, or (f) the potentiality
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various de-
partments 6n one question. 9
In Baker v. Carr the Court has defined with some particularity the
self-imposed judicial review limitations embodied in the political ques-
tion doctrine. Of special significance in Baker is the candor with which
the Court limits the political question doctrine to "the relationship
between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the federal
government, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the
States."2 Therefore, when the doctrine is applied in a federal system
the self-imposed limitations do not, in fact, limit the judiciary as much
as they would were the government not federated.
'Id. at 553-555. IId. at 211-226.
"369 U.S. 186 (1962). "Id. at 217.
1 Id. at 210. 2 Id. at 210.
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Another group of cases, which might also be loosely described as
presenting "political questions" are never even heard by the Court.
When the Court declines to exercise its certiorari power and denies
review to politically sensitive cases, there is of course no holding that
the case presents a political question. Thus the Court, unless they
must reverse the lower court decision, can avoid issues which might
be characterized as political.
An excellent example is Mora v. M1cNainara,2- involving a suit by
three draftees to prevent their departure for Vietnam, coupled with a
request for a declaratory judgment that the war was "illegal." The
suit was dismissed and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Mr.
Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Douglas dissented strongly with the
denial of certiorari, stating that the Court should at least confront
whether the issues presented were political questions and thus non-
justiciable. Mora is by no means the only example of the Court's use
of the certiorari power and other discretionary devices to avoid the
basic threshold questions of justiciability.2 2
II. THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE
A. Case Law
Political Questions: The first Japanese case2 3 involving the political
question arose out of the so-called Sunakawa Incident which took place
in July 1957 at Tachikawa Air Base near Tokyo. According to a
United States-Japanese agreement, the Japanese government was to
expand a runway at the American air base. When governmental sur-
veyors went to the surrounding farmland to survey the area which
would be taken by the expansion, they were confronted with demon-
strators who were opposed to the extension of the runway. During a
riot which ensued some rioters trespassed on the American base. Seven
of these rioters were arrested by the Japanese police and charged with
illegal entry of an American base. The special criminal law24 under
- 389 U.S. 934 (1967).
'See generally A. BICKEL, TIE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 69-71 (1962), for
discussion of the necessity of these techniques of avoidance. Scharf, Judicial Review
and the Political Question-A Function of Analysis 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966), effec-
tively demonstrates the difference between the political question doctrine and these
techniques of avoidance.
'Japan v. Sakata, 13 Saik6 saibansho keiji hanreishfi [hereinafter cited Keishi]
3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16, 1959).
2'Nipponkoku to amerika-gasshlkoku to no an-en hosh6 j~yaku daisan-jO id
iotofukt gyseikyjtei ni tonionau keiji-tokubetsuh (Special criminal act accom-
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which the accused were charged imposed a penalty heavier than that
for the identical crimes of trespass included in the minor offenses law.
Because the law was enacted to implement the United States-Japan
Security Treaty of 1951 and an administrative agreement supplemen-
tary thereto, counsel for defense not only denied the guilt of the de-
fendants but also asserted that under Article 9, the Security Treaty
itself was illegal, thus raising a constitutional defense: The Tokyo
District Court acquitted the defendants at trial.2 5 The court refused to
accept the doctrine of political question, reviewed the constitutionality
of the Treaty, and held the Treaty unconstitutional and invalid. The
Tokyo Public Prosecutors' Office immediately used the "jumping"
jjkoku appeal procedure2 6 to appeal directly to the Supreme Court.
The .Grand Bench of the Supreme Court quashed the lower court deci-
sion and remanded the case.
Although all fifteen justices concurred in reversing the judgment
rendered by the trial court there were separate opinions. Eleven jus-
ices concluded that the question was non-justiciable because of the
political question doctrine. The remaining four justices either denied
or did not resort to the doctrine of political question but reached the
same conclusion as the majority did after a substantive review of the
constitutionality of the Security Treaty and the administrative agree-
ment. Because this was the first time that the Supreme Court was con-
fronted with a case clearly involving the doctrine of political question,
the many separate opinions concerning the doctrine add further elab-
oration to the rather brief opinion of the Court; although, of course,
not all of the various views expressed have equal weight. The Court, in
part, stated: 2 7
The Security Treaty in the present case must be regarded as having a
highly political nature which... possesses an extremely important rela-
panying the administrative agreement based on article 3 of the Japan-United States
Security Treaty) (Law No. 138, 1952) provided in article 2:
Any person who, without due cause, enters any place the entrance of which is
is prohibited or does not leave any place when requested, within facilities or
areas in uses by the U.S. armed forces shall be sentenced to penal servitude for
not more than one year or a fine or not more than 2,000 yen or minor fine ...
The title of the statute was changed in 1960 by Law No. 102, as a result of the
amendment to the Treaty, but the substance remains the same.
'See 13 Keishdi 3305.
CODE OF CRIIlNAL PROCEDURE art. 406 and Keiji sosho kisoku (Rules of Criminal
Procedure) (Supreme Court Regulation 32, 1948) art. 254 provides in effect that
the public prosecutor can appeal directly to the Supreme Court when a district court
rendered a decision holding that certain statute or governmental act to be uncon-
stitutional.
' 13 Keishil 3234-35, English translation in MAxi at 305-306. For an excellent
bibliography on the Sunakawa case, see 38 H6aRrsu Jm6 (No. 2) 211-212 (1966).
1968]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
tion to the basis of the existence of our country as a sovereign nation.
There are not few points in which a legal decision as to the unconstitu-
tionality of its content is simply the other side of the coin of the political
or discretionary decision of the cabinet, which concluded the treaty, or
of the National Diet, which gave its consent to it. Consequently, the legal
decision as to unconstitutionality has a character which, as a matter of
principle, is not adaptable to review by a judicial court, which has as its
mission a purely judicial function; accordingly, it falls outside the right
of judicial review by the courts, unless there is clearly obvious uncon-
stitutionality and invalidity. It is proper to interpret this primarily as a
matter that must be entrusted to the decision of the cabinet, which pos-
sesses the power to conclude treaties, and of the National Diet, which
has the power to approve them; and it ultimately must be left to the
political review of the sovereign people.
The Court continued to note in dicta that the retention of the
United States Armed Forces in fact was in accord with the intent of
Article 9, of Article 98, paragraph 2, and also of the Preamble of the
Constitution, and as such cannot be regarded as being "patently un-
constitutional and invalid."
There are many questions raised by the opinion of the Court, which
was the first expression of judicial efforts to utilize this new concept of
the limitation to the judicial power in Japan. First, in spite of the
Court's statement that the determination of the constitutionaliy of the
Security Treaty was not subject to judicial review, the Court actually
reviewed the treaty and the accompanying administrative agreement.
Although the supplementary opinions by Justices Fujita, Irie and
Tarumi demonstrate that the courts have a right to decide whether
cases fall into the category of the political question or not, the major-
ity opinion is not clear as to how far the courts should go in determin-
ing the justiciability of a case involving an allegedly political question.
It should be noted here that some Japanese jurists deny the doctrine
of political question as applied to Japanese legal order partly because
they believe that the doctrine does not allow a review of ancillary
jurisdiction much less a substantive review. They refute the contention
that the issues considered to be political questions should not be re-
viewed and if necessary held unconstitutional because of any greater
"evils" which might result from such a judicial decision. They believe
the contention is untenable because only after subjecting the political
question to judicial review could the suspected illegality of the action
and the "uncontrollable consequences" which would arise from judi-
[ VOL. 43 : 1031
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cial nullification of the action be ascertained. This criticism by the
opponents" of the political question doctrine indicates their lack of
appreciation, if not misunderstanding, of the theory and practice by
the Court asserting a legal right to determine whether or not a given
case falls within the category of political question based on a substan-
tive review as well as a review on ancillary jurisdiction. Nonetheless it
points to an initial problem area, namely, a theoretical distinction
between a narrow judicial review focusing on whether a given case is a
matter of political question and excluding any judicial determination
of constitutionality, on the one hand, and a broader judicial review
adjudicating the substantive constitutionality, on the other hand.
Additionally, when the Court held that the Security Treaty and the
administrative agreement fell within the category of political question
because of their highly political nature and the important relation they
had to the existence of the country, it raised two questions in the
minds of certain justices: (1) the relation between the political ques-
tion and the treaty, and (2) the feasibility of the ground given by the
Court, rendering the treaty and administrative agreement non-justi-
ciable political questions. Pointing to the Court's "misleading" opinion
on the first point, Justices Fujita, Irie, Tarumi and Ishizaka made
their views clear by stating that treaties in general never were non-
justiciable as political questions.29 Justice Tarumi construed the do-
mestic aspects of treaties as generally subject to judicial review just
as domestic laws, although the court cannot deny the validity of trea-
ties in international law. However, once a political question is involved,
Tarumi states, those parts of the treaties dealing with the domestic
law also lie outside the judicial competence. 0 Next, in answer to the
majority opinion's statements on the political question doctrine, Jus-
tices Okuno and Takahashi question the wisdom of denying review
whenever any issue has a high political content or is so indivisibly
related to important national politics that it becomes an issue of politi-
cal question. They fear that the position of the majority group will, in
the long run, lead to undue restraints on the judicial power inasmuch
as acts like concluding treaties and the passage of laws are, for the
'See T. ISOZAKI, T6CHIK6ISETSU HIHAN (Criticism on the act of government
doctrine) 93-122 (1965). See also text at note 85 infra.
13 Keishii at 3250, 3258, 3267.
Many jurists however express the opinion that judicial review does not extend to
treaties in general. See, e.g., T. MIYAZAWA, KIsuP6 (Constitution) 385 (1962); M.
ITo, KEMP6 NYOMON (Introduction to Constitutional Law) 247 (1966).
13 Keishi at 3257.
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most part, of a highly political nature relating to important national
politics, and could readily be deemed unreviewable by the courts.31
Closely related to this point is a third criticism of the criteria for
determining what is "clearly unconstitutional." Although the opinion
of the court does not indicate any such criteria, Justices Shima, D.
Kawamura and Ishizaka believe that the "spirit 9f pacifism and inter-
national cooperation" embodied in the Constitution or a general con-
formity to the Charter of the United Nations offer a general guideline
to determine an abuse of the discretionary power given to the political
branches of government. 32 However, other Justices like Kotani, Irie
and Fujita argue that what the majority opinion regards as "clearly
unconstitutional" is something which, in actuality, exists only in name
and not in reality. Based on this observation, Kotani concludes that
whenever unconstitutionality exists in the discretionary actions of the
political departments, then such actions are subject to constitutional
review by the courts regardless of the "magnitude" of the alleged un-
constitutionality. 33 Unlike Justice Kotani, who thus completely elimi-
nates the doctrine of political question, Justices Fujita and Irie, in
spite of their view that "clear unconstitutionality" is an overly abstract
and unworkable standard, subscribe to the doctrine of political ques-
tion as derived from the separation of powers." Since the opinion of
the court is silent about a theoretical ground to support the political
question in the present case, the concurring opinion of these two just-
ices provides the base theoretical rationale for it. They conceive of the
political question as a consequence of the mutual checks and balances
of the three powers of government and as necessary to prevent the
absolute supremacy of the judicial power over the legislative and the
executive. They argue that although the Constitution does not provide
for the doctrine of the political question expressly, such a limitation
upon the judicial power should be construed to be "inherent in the in-
trinsic nature of the constitutional judicial power because of such con-
siderations as the high political content of acts of government, the
character of the courts as judicial organs, and the procedural limita-
tions necessarily accompanying justice. '35 Justices Ishizaka and Ta-
rumi also make a passing remark on the separation of powers and it
seems that the majority of the justices have discovered a rationale for
31 Id. at 3281-82.
'" Id. at 3243, 3261.
" Id. at 3275-79.
"Id. at 3250-51.
Id. at 3246.
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the political question doctrine in the separation of powers as that term
was interpreted by their colleagues Fujita and Irie. 6
Three justices, Kotani, Okuno and Takahashi, dissented from the
majority group on the political question issue. Justice Kotani relies
partially on the provisions of Articles 81 and 76(3) of the Constitution
as a rationalization for his denial of the political question doctrine, and
concludes that because there will be no "clearly obvious unconstitu-
tionality" in actuality, the decision of the majority group virtually
precludes any judicial review of most of the important actions taken
by the political branches of government, thereby downgrading the
constitutional idea of judicial supremacy and the rule of law to rule
by "force" and "authority." Justices Okuno and Takahashi take a
different position and do not apply the political question doctrine in
the present case. Unlike Kotani, they do not necessarily deny the doc-
trine but insist that a criterion for its application should be sought in
the distinction between a legal judgment and a political judgment and
that so long as a case is reviewable in purely legal terms, the political
question doctrine should be excluded. Then both justices examine the
constitutionality of the Security Treaty and admit that at least the
evaluation of the international and military situation given in the Pre-
amble to the Treaty is a "so-called political question" and as such must
be accepted by the courts.37 They conclude by finding other parts of
the Treaty constitutional.
One aspect of the Sunakawa decision which created considerable
controversy was its dicta to the effect that a political question might
be reviewed if it presented "clearly obvious unconstitutionality or in-
validity."38 Yet, as we shall see presently, the Supreme Court did not
always apply this dicta in later cases. On the other hand, the judgment
in Koskiyama,39 which was not treated as a traditional "political ques-
tion" case, stated that in case of extreme inequality in the apportion-
ment of Diet election districts, a problem of unconstitutionality might
Id. at 3256, 3266.
For example, Justices Okuno and Takahashi state as follows:
[T]he Security Treaty has been concluded in accordance with the provisions of
Article 5(c) and Article 6(a) of the Treaty of Peace on the premise that there
is danger of armed attack on Japan "because irresponsible militarism has not yet
been driven from the world" (this evaluation of international situation cannot be
subject to review and judgment by the courts because it is a so-called political
question).
Id. at 3283-84.
Id. at 3235.
Koshiyama v. Chairman of the Tokyo Metropolitan Election Control Commis-
sion, 18 Saiko saibansho minji hanreishCi [hereinafter cited Minshfi] 270 (Sup. Ct.,
G.B., Feb. 5, 1964). See note 53 infra and accompanying text.
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arise and become justiciable," thus paying at least lip service to the
Sunakawa dicta. However, this level of inequality was not found in
Koshiyama.
The so-called "second Tomabechi case" came to Tokyo District
Court when plaintiff Tomabechi renewed a suit demanding his salary
and a confirmation by the court, contending that because the dissolu-
tion of August, 1952, was unconstitutional and invalid, he still was a
member of the House of Representatives. In response, the State
(j5koku appellee) resorted to the political question doctrine, also con-
tending in the alternative that the dissolution met the constitutional
requirement of advice and consent of the Cabinet. The district court
dismissed the political question defense of the state and held that a
dispute over the validity of a dissolution is justiciable."' The lower
court further stated that in this case the dissolution lacked the neces-
sary advice and consent. However, this remarkable decision, judging
the dissolution unconstitutional and consequently void, was set aside
by the intermediate appellate court when, in spite of a basic agreement
with the trial court on the political question problem, the court held as
a matter of fact that the events which took place at a Cabinet meeting
and the subsequent "advice and consent" given to the Emperor on the
decision to dissovle the house should be left to the discretion of the
Premier and those Cabinet members who have knowledge of the full
political situation involved. Thus, despite the categorical rejection of
the political question defense, the court nevertheless accepted the
governmental judgment holding that there was the requisite advice
and consent.
Upon a j6koku appeal, the same members of the Supreme Court
who decided the Sunakawa case half a year previously handed down
their judgment. Although all justices agreed in dismissing the appeal, 3
four justices, Kotani, Okuno, D. Kawamura and Ishizaka dissented on
the political question issue. The four justices held the dissolution con-
stitutional only after a substantive review of the case.4 4 The opinion
of the Court, representing the views of ten justices, reiterated the
points expounded in the Sunakawa case, stating that the dissolution of
the house was an act of an extremely important political nature, relat-
ing to the basic government of the state and was thus outside the
" 18 Minsh'i at 273.
"Tomabechi v. Japan, 14 Minsh6 1251 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Oct. 19, 1953).
"' Id. at 1265 et seq.
43 Id. at 1206, 1210.
"Id. at 1213, 1215, 1218.
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purview of judicial review.45 Because the court had no power to exam-
ine the defendant's contention that the government had misapplied
constitutional provisions relating to the dissolution, the intermediate
appellate court had made an error in reaching the merits of the advice
and consent issue. The opinion of the Court sought the rationale for
the doctrine of political question not only in the principle of separation
of powers as the principle was explained by Justices Fujita and Irie in
Sunakawa, but also held alternatively that an act raising political
questions should not be nullified because of the grave and undesirable
consequences, both in law and politics, resulting from such a decision.
The opinion states in part:4 6
The dissolution of the House of Representatives causes the members
thereof to lose their qualifications contrary to their will and causes the
functioning of the House, the highest organ of the State, to stop however
temporarily such a stoppage may be and also induces the formation of a
new composition of the House and a new cabinet through an ensuing
general election. In this sense, the act of the dissolution is of a great
legal significance. Furthermore, a dissolution is conducted often when
the cabinet seeks to find the general opinion of the people on its major
policies or on its own continued existence, so that its political signifi-
cance is likewise grave.
Okuno, in a joint opinion with Kotani, wrote that the dissolution fell
within the definition of "official act" in Article 81 of the Constitution.
In their opinion, however many political attributes an act of the polit-
ical branches of government may possess, such an act is within the pur-
view of the judicial power so long as a judicial remedy is available.
Both justices construed the provision of Article 81 of the Constitution
in such a way that the protection of fundamental human rights of the
individual will outweigh the doctrine of political question when they
come into conflict. They believed, therefore, that inasmuch as the
dissolution in the present case clearly affected the alleged rights of the
appellant as a member of the House of Representatives, the constitu-
tionality of such a dissolution should be and was capable of being ju-
dicially reviewed.47 Justices D. Kawamura and Ishizaka, who concurred
with the majority in Sunakawa, joined the dissenting group in the pres-
ent case denying the applicability of the political question doctrine."
"Id. at 1209.
'
0 Id. at 1209-10. For a bibliography for the commentaries of the Toinabechi case,
see SAIK6 SAIBANSHO CHOSAKANSHITSU, SAIX6 SAIBANSHO HANREI KAISETSU: 1960(Minji) 206-07 (1964).
" 14 Minshii at 1211-13.
"Id. at 1214, 1218.
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In keeping with the Sunakawa dicta, the majority held the dissolu-
tion a conditional act of state unless there be "clearly obvious uncon-
stitutionality and invalidity" in the act of dissolving the House. How-
ever, the opinion does not disclose any preliminary review such as in
Sunakawa. In spite of this difference, the opinions of the Court in the
two cases agreed that the governmental act was 'one of a highly politi-
cal nature, closely related to the fundamentals of national policy. This
distinction becomes even more significant when in subsequent cases
the Court did not use political question language but rather held cases
justiciable on the ground on "autonomous," "internal" or "discretion-
ary" matters delegated specifically by the Constitution to either the
Cabinet or the National Diet.
In Matsumoto v. Japan, three plaintiffs tried to establish the invalid-
ity of the lease of land to the Japanese government for the use of the
United States Air Force. Plaintiffs contended that because the objec-
tive of the lease, made during the occupation, was to provide the
United States Air Force with an air base at Itazuke, such a lease was
in contravention of Article 9 of the Constitution. The Fukuoka Dis-
trict Court (the trial court) gave judgment to plaintiffs despite an at-
tempted political question defense. 9 However, on March 5, 1960, the
Fukuoka High Court (intermediate appellate court) set aside the
judgment by the trial court on two accounts.5" First, the court held
that the remedy sought by plaintiff, removal of the installation, was an
abuse of their right inasmuch as the damage to be incurred by the
government for such a removal would be conspicuously larger than
that suffered by the property owners. The second ground, however,
is more significant.
The court, subscribing to the political question doctrine, overruled
the plaintiff's contention based on the alleged unconstitutionality of
the Security Treaty. In so doing, the high court repeated the opinion of
the Supreme Court in Sunakawa almost verbatim and added the fol-
lowing opinion of its own: 5'
The organization, the function and the decisional procedure of the court
are not suitable to collect, analyze and make an adequate judgment upon
19 Minsh6 321 (Fukuoka Dist. Ct., Feb. 13, 1956).
o Id. at 339-52.
51Id. at 349. The third Petty Bench of the Supreme Court (Justices Gokijy6.
Ishizaka, Yokota, Kashiwabara, and Tanaka sitting) dismissed plaintiffs ]6koku
appeal on March 9, 1965. The Court considered Sunakawa the applicable precedent
and upheld the judgment of the intermediate appellate court on the political question
issue. Id. 233-38. For a bibliography of commentaries of the Matsiunoto case, see 38
H6RITSU JIH6 (No. 2) 210 (1966).
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the information concerning a highly political question like this. Not only
that, such a political question often arises out of conflicting political
forces (as is well known, both public and scholars' opinions have been
sharply divided into two opposing groups over the issue of the uncon-
stitutionality of the said Security Treaty and of the stationing of United
States forces). The intervention by the court, against the very nature of
the judiciary which is supposed to stay out of political issues, into politi-
cal conflicts will result into the politicization of the judiciary by sanction-
ing one side against the other and also will endanger judicial neutrality
in the long run. In short, the determination of unconstitutionality of the
Security Treaty in question is beyond the judicial competence.
Quasi-Political Questions: The next group of cases do not, strictly
speaking, invoke the political question language. However, they are
worthy of close study because of the many integrally related issues.
First, these cases were regarded by the Supreme Court not as cases of
a highly political nature indivisibly tied to the very foundation of gov-
ernment, but rather as involving discretionary matters of the coordi-
nate branches of government. The political question cases dealt with
so far concern areas integral to the political functioning of the nation;
the following group of cases were concerned with non-justiciable mat-
ters more firmly based on the principle of separation of powers.52
The first case in this group of "internal discretionary matters" was
Koskiyama. 3 In 1962, after an election for the House of Councillors,
a voter in Tokyo brought a suit to the Tokyo High Court contending
that the election held in Tokyo was invalid because the malapportion-
ment in the districting created an inequality, thereby violating the
constitutional provision for equal treatment. The trial court refused to
accept plaintiff's contention.5 4 The Supreme Court, in dismissing the
subsequent jjkoku-appeal, held that the question of the apportionment
of the number of members of both Houses should be construed to have
been left, in principle, "to the discretionary authority of ... the Na-
tional Diet." Only in cases of extreme inequality "in the enjoyment
of the elector's election rights" would the Court interfere. The Court
"There is a traditional distinction which should be made between the "act of gov-
erning" (tOchi k6i) and the "autonomous right" (jiritsuken). Included within the
latter category are the rights provided in Article 55 and Article 58(1), (2) of the
Constitution and also the internal police and peace maintenance rights provided in
articles 114 and 116 of the National Diet Law. See Yokota, Rippo no jiritsuken to
shihoken (Autonomous right of legislative and judiciary), JuRIsuTo (No. 337) 24-38
(1966). H. WADA, ENSHfY RxEmB (Seminars on Constitution) 229-238 (1966). Hara,
Giin no jiritsusei (Autonomous right of legislature), in 3 KEzAP6 xOZA (S. Kiyomiya
and I. Sat6 eds.) (1964).
Minshii 270 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Feb. 5, 1964).
" Id. at 304.
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stated: "Inequality, to the extent it exists today... is still only a
problem of the propriety of legislative policy and we cannot recognize
the emergence of a question of unconstitutionality. " 55
The majority opinion in Koshiyama, repeating the "clearly obvious"
unconstitutionality dicta from Sunakawa, added that in cases of ex-
treme inequality, a problem of unconstitutionality might arise and that
the Court might invalidate the apportionment schedule attached to the
election law. Justice Sait6's opinion on this point implied that the
Court should not pass any judgment even in cases of alleged extreme
inequality of apportionment because of the confusion which might
arise from discrepancies of discretion and judgment exercised by both
the National Diet and the Court in determining the existence of such
an extremely unequal apportionment. At the same time he expressed
a strong doubt about the legality of pursuing any claim in a suit to
void an election.5
A second case in this category involved a potential conflict between
the Cabinet and the judiciary. Giichir6 Yoneuchiyama, a member of
the prefectural assembly in Aomori Prefecture, was expelled in 1952.
by the resolution of the assembly itself on the charge that his remarks
at a general meeting violated the general rule of conduct for members
of the assembly. He sought an injunction from the district court order-
ing the suspension of the expulsion. In granting the injunction, the
court held that the resolution to expel the member of the local assem-
bly was an administrative action, that the punishment was not a mat-
ter of unfettered discretion and that such a punishment went beyond
the disciplinary power of the assembly." Prime Minister Yoshida
made a formal objection to the injunction under a procedure provided
by a special procedural law of administrative cases. 8
'Id. at 273. The composition of the Court membership was quite different from
that of the Court which decided both Sunakawa and Tomabechi cases. Out of the
thirteen justices who participated in the decision in Koshiyama only four of them
(Justices Irie, Ishizaka, Okuno, Shimoiizaka) were present in the earlier two cases.
Justice Okuno (who did not support the doctrine of political question in either Suna-
ka'Wa or Toniabechi) and Justice Ishizaka (who did not regard Toinabechi as a
political question) joined the opinion of the court. The only supplementary opinion
was written by a new justice, Sakuo Sait6, who disagreed with the majority opinion
on a qualification attached to the nonjusticiability of cases involving the malapportion-
ment of election districts.
'OId. at 273-75.
"See Yoneuchiyama v. Aomori Prefectural Assembly, 7 Minshfi 43 (Aomori Dist.
Ct., April 28, 1952).
'Gyseijiken sosho tokureiho (Law No. 81, 1948) art. 10(2) read that "in case
of a suit brought based on article 2 of this law, the courts may, when they recognize
it urgently necessary to avoid uncompensable damages arising from an execution, of
dispositions, issue, upon a request by petition or on their own authority, an injunction
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When the Aomori District Court dismissed the objection from the
Premier on the ground that the contentions of the objection did not
have the required legal specificity, the Aomori Prefectural Assembly
made a special kikoku appeal to the Supreme Court, contending in
part that the district court, in its decision to dismiss the Premier's
objection, reviewed the question of adequacy and inadequacy of the
objection despite the disclaimer of such a review."0
The local assembly claimed that they should be granted the same
"self-autonomy pertaining to the internal matters of the National As-
sembly which the Supreme Court has granted to the National Diet."6 0
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the statute re-
quired the Premier to lodge any objection prior to the court's an-
nouncement of its injunction.6 Thus, the majority decided this case on
statutory construction rather than constitutional grounds. Only five
justices wrote separate opinions referring to the judicial power in its
relation to the local assembly. Three justices, Tanaka, Kuriyama and
Kobayashi, were of the opinion that the disciplinary measure of ex-
pelling members of local assembly was an internal matter of the legis-
lative body. Chief Justice Tanaka elaborated on this point as follows:6"
In essence, it will not be contrary to a generally accepted theory to
recognize some areas of pure self-autonomy in relation to the National
Diet and other assemblies, where judicial power is not allowed to inter-
vene. The problem of discipline of their members as in the instant case
should be considered to fall into this area....
With regard to the discipline at a local assembly, the assembly itself is,
like the National Diet, the final arbitor. Even in a situation where the
punishment was imposed despite the doubtful existence, as a matter of
fact, of grounds for such a punishment or in which a relatively heavy
penalty was inflicted for a minor misconduct, these problems are related,
after all, to fact-findings and discretion and consequently the question
of adequacy and inadequacy thereof is a political question and not a
problem of illegality.
in the form of kettei (decision) to stop the execution of disposition. But when it is
deemed that such an injunction may bring about grave effect upon the public welfare
and also when the prime minister makes an objection to such an injunction, the courts
may not do so." Presently the same procedural rule is retained in arts. 25(2), (3),
27(i) of Gyaseijiken soshohC (Law No. 139, 1962). But it is noteworthy that an
express sentence is now added enabling the Premier to object even after the injunc-
tion. As to the details and criticism of this procedure, see Ogawa, Judicial Review of
Administrative Actions in Japan, in this symposium p. 1075 infra.
7 Minshfi at 40.
Id. at 41.
'7 Minsha 12, at 14 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Jan. 16, 1953). For a bibliography of the
Yoncliyama case, see GY6sEiH6 343 (J. Tanaka ed. 1964).
'7 Minshfi at 16, 17.
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Likewise, Justice Kobayashi regarded the disciplinary measures im-
posed upon a member of a local assembly as a "political function
which an assembly can decide on its own free will in accordance with
the principle of majority rule."6 3 Both Tanaka and Kobayashi con-
ceded that in a case where an assembly's disciplinary action is uncon-
stitutional then the aggrieved representative 5an bring a suit in
court.6" Justice Mano went even further in stating that article 10, sec-
tion 2, of the special law was unconstitutional, and violated the prin-
ciple of separation of powers to the extent that it conferred upon the
Premier, the chief executive, the power to interfere with judicial deci-
sions granting injunctions against administrative actions.6 " On the
question of the specific expulsion involved, he believed local assemblies
to be basically administrative agencies, because "the assembly which
makes ordinances and assembly regulations does not become a legisla-
tive organ in the sense of the Constitution any more than the Supreme
Court which makes rules and regulations does."6 6 Furthermore, so
long as the local assembly decided on matters like the expulsion of
their members, their actions were administrative inasmuch as such an
action had an immediate legal effect upon rights of injured members
as individuals.6 7 Although the majority dismissed the appeal on the
technical ground of the Premier's delayed objection, it assumed, like
Mano, that the expulsion was subject to judicial review. Two justices,
Tanaka and Kuriyama, dissented on this point. In addition Justice
Kobayashi, while concurring with the majority's dismissal, agreed with
Justices Tanaka and Kuriyama about the non-justiciable nature of the
expulsion. 8
A third case demonstrates the restraint exercised by the Court as
early as in 1949 when confronted with an "autonomous question of the
National Diet." The case was the famous "Nishio" case69 in which
Suehiro Nishio, the general secretary of the Katayama Cabinet, re-
ceived 500,000 yen in 1947 as a political contribution from business
firms. The Tokyo Prosecutors' Office charged him with failure to
report it in compliance with a law regulating political contribution.
The defendant contended that the contribution was made to him as an
individual and as such was not subject to the law. This argument was
Id. at 36.
' Id. at 15, 36.
'" Id. at 23-27.
' Id. at 32-33.
¢'Id. at 33.
Id. at 37.
"Japan v. Nishio, 3 Keishfi 901 (Sup. Ct., G.B., June 1, 1949).
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accepted by the Tokyo High Court. Upon the appeal by the Prosecu-
tor's Office, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision on
two grounds. Eleven out of the thirteen justices who participated in
this case agreed with the finding of the Tokyo High Court concerning
the nature of the political contribution made to the defendant. Alter-
natively, all of the thirteen justices held the case to be non-justiciable
and in contravention of the provisions of articles 6 and 8 of the law
concerning the oath and testimony by the witnesses before the Na-
tional Diet.7" The opinion of the Court states in part that:7
The examination of the process by which the law concerning the oath
and testimony by the witnesses before the National Diet... was legis-
lated indicates that the law is designed to provide internal procedures
of'the Assembly, enacted to meet the need for the investigation of na-
tional government at each House. And in light of the intention by which
special provisions like the text and proviso of article 8 therein were
specially inserted concerning the initiation of prosecuting those who
commit the perjury and other crimes at the Assembly, the crime of such
a perjury should be regarded as an autonomous problem of the Assembly
and the initiation of the prosecution for such a crime should be construed
to be a necessary condition, as required in those provisions. However, it
is clear that the decision to prosecute the defendant, accused of perjury,
stemmed neither from the House of Representatives nor from its commit-
tee, and consequently the public charge against the crime should be ad-
judged unlawful. Therefore, the judgment of the original court in the
instant case, which accepted the public charge against the perjury and
then undertook a substantive review and acquitted the defendant should
be adjudged unlawful... and be quashed.
Another case involved the so-called "taxpayer's suit." A taxpayer, a
resident of Osaka, sought an investigation of the additional budget for
1954, which would be required as a result of the police law passed by
the National Diet in that year. In Shimizu v. Governor of Osaka
Metropolis,72 the plaintiff contended that the police law was void be-
cause of an invalid resolution of the House of Representatives extend-
ing its session. The police law was subsequently passed during the
allegedly invalid session. In addition, plaintiff contended that the
police law violated a provision of Article 92 of the Constitution deal-
' Giin ni okerc shnin no sensei oyobi shcgento ni kansuru J,8ritsu (Law No. 225,
1947).
13 Keishii at 906.
"Shimizu v. Governor of Osaka Metropolis, 16 Minshfi 445 (Sup. Ct., G.B.,
March 7, 1962). For comment on this case, see Tanaka, Shihoken to rippokew-
Keisatsnho Kaisei i nka jiken (Judiciary and Legislative: Police law case) in Kempo
hanreilhyaktsen, 194 JURISUTO (Special issue) (1963).
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ing with local self-government. Consequently, the additional budgetary
appropriation by the Osaka Metropolitan Assembly was unlawful. The
defense counsel in refutation stated that the courts do not have the
power to decide the question of whether the resolution by the House
to extend its own session was valid, or not, for the question is political
in nature, pertaining to the internal matters of the National Diet.
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court made two things clear
in connection with the political question doctrine. First, it held that the
courts were not empowered to investigate the actual processes of legis-
lative activities and to pass any judgment on the question of validity
of the processes of passing a law. The Court states in part:
73
So long as the police law is deemed to have been passed by the reso-
lution of both Houses and to have been in force in compliance with
lawful procedure, the courts should respect the autonomy of the Houses
and should not investigate any facts, as presented by the plaintiff, con-
cerning the legislative procedure of the law, and should not pass any
judgment upon the question of validity or invalidity thereof.
Thus while recognizing that the actual legislative process at the Na-
tional Diet was an internal matter of the legislative branch of govern-
ment and as such outside judicial power, the Court held that once a
law is enacted, the content of such a law is subject to judicial review.
Indeed, the majority of the Court reviewed substantively the police
law and held it constitutional."4 In addition, the majority held that the
legality of the resolution presented a justiciable question and stated
"that a resolution by an assembly does not make an unlawful expendi-
ture a lawful one."'7 It follows that a taxpayer can challenge in court
the resolution by a local public body approving the expenditure of
public money. Although there were dissenting opinions as to whether
a taxpayer in this case should be allowed to bring a suit or not, the
Court was unanimous on the question of the actual legislative process
at the National Diet.
B. Scholarly Opinion
In analyzing judicial opinions on the theory of political question,
some attention must be given to the Japanese Court's reception of the
opinions of both Western and Japanese scholars, as well as of judicial
precedents in the Western countries. Justices Fujita and Irie, in their
" 16 Minshfi at 450.
74 Id.
5 Id. at 449.
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supplementary opinion in the Sunakawa case particularly demonstrate
this latter influence:"
Thus, in respect to the development and the theoretical basis of this
matter (i.e., the political question) and the scope of the acts involved,
there must be certain variations, but for many years there have been
precedents for them in the countries of Europe and America: "acte de
gouvernement" in France, "act of state" or "matter of state" in Great
Britain, or "political question" in the United States. In postwar West
Germany "Regierungsakt" and "Hoheitsakt" have been approved in
academic theory in relation to Article 19 of the Bonn Constitution. In
our own country, as is well known, since the coming into effect of the
Constitution of Japan, this has also come to be recognized by many
scholars of public law as included in the concept of act of government.
Justice Tarumi continued further in a separate opinion:"
I am not completely familiar with what is termed "acts of government,"
or "acts of high authority not subject to review by the courts," or "po-
litical questions" in American and European constitutions, but in our
country although it may be difficult to define the concept of "acts of gov-
ernment" or to list them exhaustively, there is the academic theory that
there are some acts in both the National Diet and the government that
should not be subjected to the right of constitutional review by the
courts.
In view of the fact that the Supreme Court justices were obviously
aware of and probably used as their frame of reference, scholars' opin-
ions7" and foreign experiences with the doctrine of political questions,
analysis of these theories, both supporting and denying the validity of
the concept of political question, will contribute to analysis of the
decision in Sunakawa and subsequent cases.
With the establishment of the principle of judicial supremacy under
the new Constitution, the doctrine of tichikii (acts of government)
took on new meaning and significance among legal professionals and
jurists. Indeed the Japanese Academic Conference, at its fifteenth gen-
eral meeting held in May, 1955, included this subject as an item of
the agenda and gathered many participants to discuss theories and
practices in foreign countries such as the United States, Britain,
France and West Germany. Subsequently, many proponents have
'a 13 Keishii at 3246-47.
' Id. at 3256, English translation in MAKI at 329.
s See note 1 supra. See also T. MIYAZAWA, KEMP6 To SAiBAN (Constitution and
Judicial decision) (1967). Note particularly sections on "France hanrei ni okern
tchli k~i" (at 99) and "Gyftei saiban to tachi saya: France ha 2i okeri tWchi
kei no gainen" (at 73).
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sought to provide a theoretical rationale for the doctrine, with varying
degrees of success.
According to one view,79 admittedly stemming more from political
necessity than theoretical reasoning, the harm or evil which may result
from judicial review and subsequent nullification of a political ques-
tion is more dangerous than that which may arisb as a result of judi-
cial restraint and toleration of actions which would be illegal were they
not "political questions." In order to avoid this danger, legal questions
indivisibly tied to a political question should be absorbed and sub-
merged into the political question and not be determined by the Court.
A major theoretical shortcoming in this seemingly pragmatic approach
is the fallacious assumption that political consequences resulting from
judicial activism will be any worse than the legal consequences result-
ing from judicial restraint based on the political question. This as-
sumption seems to underlie the opinion of the majority justices in the
second Tomabechi case stating that an act political question should
not be null and void because of the grave and undesirable conse-
quences which will result from such a judgment. Proponents of this
view believe the Court was indeed comparing and balancing the con-
sequences resulting from the dissolution against the legal consequences
of upholding the appellant's claim for salary and house membership.
A second view, seeking a rationale for the political question doctrine
in the principle of separation of powers,"° was presented by a Supreme
Court Justice Irie, before the Sunakawa case came to the Court. Since
the majority opinions of the Court in both Sunakawa and Tomabecki
followed some of the reasoning of Justice Irie, an examination of Irie's
' See Yamada, Shi-igiib no kaisan to t~chi kii (The dissolution of parliament and
political questions), 27 HORITSU RONS6 (No. 4) 35 (1954) : Minshushrigi shokOku ni
okern t6chi k5i (Political questions in democratic states) 27 H6RITSU RONS6 (Nos.
5-6) 1 (1954). As examples of political questions specifically based on statutory laws,
Yamada points out provisions of article 11 of the Special Procedural Law of the
Administrative Cases which stipulates that the kokoku-appeal lodged against admin-
istrative actions can be dismissed by a court when it judges the nullification or
changes in such actions, which may be contravention of laws, to be detrimental to
the public welfare. Note also the provision of article 205 of the Public Office Election
Law which provides that when a suit is brought out challenging the result of an
election, the court is not allowed to judge invalid the result of an election, even when
a violation is committed unless there is a danger of affecting the result of the election.
" Even those who support a different rationale for the political question doctrine
recognize that the principle of separation of powers provides a basis for the doctrine.
The opinion of Justice Irie has been singled out here for an examination because of
its unique argument and exposition. For an argument for political question based on
Anglo-American idea of separation of powers, see Yokota, Ikensinsaken to sanken-
bunritsu-America no honrei ni soku-shite (Judicial review of constitutionality and
separation of powers-comparing with American cases), 15 H6s6 J1H6 (No. 1) 1-14
(1963).
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view may further clarify the position of the Court. He wrote that
within the present system of separation of powers, there is some
power which is not distributed to any one of the three branches of the
government. Direct popular voting, popular initiatives and recalls are
those powers which are specifically reserved for the people by the
Constitution, but even in the absence of explicit legal provisions, Irie
believes that there are some other powers which are reserved for the
people. From the viewpoint of the judiciary, these reserved powers
become the so-called political questions. In other words, judicial
power, confronted with the political realm, recognizes some non-
justiciable areas into which it does not go because of political necessity
and feasibility. Thus, political questions should be settled, ideally, by
the .political judgment of the people themselves,8' and appropriate
provisions should be made in the Constitution establishing an arrange-
ment such as direct participation of the people in the judgment of
alleged political questions or a special constitutional court. Without
such an arrangement, the court has to let the judgment made by the
political departments stand until the following election when the peo-
ple will pass their judgment on the governmental action. It seems to
follow from this line of argument that matters which clearly fall within
the scope of authority of either the Cabinet or the National Diet would
not be considered political questions. However, in the Koshiyama case
Irie concurred in the opinion holding that the question of electoral
apportionment in that case fell within the category of discretionary
authority of the National Diet and as such was non-justiciable. Fur-
thermore, the list8 2 of different types of political questions, published
prior to the disposition of the Sunakawa case, also includes those mat-
ters which concern internal affairs of political departments of govern-
ment, conferred upon them specifically by the Constitution. Thus, it
does not seem that Irie is certain as to whether his conception of acts
of state includes only those powers reserved to the people or it encom-
' This concept is similar to that of Justice Woodbury, in his dissenting opinion in
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), where he expressed the idea that
political questions are not within the jurisdiction of the courts because their deter-
mination rests with the electorate. See generally C. POST THE SUPREME COURT AND
POLITICAL QUESTIONS 12 (1936).
'Justice Irie includes in the category of the act of government the following:
1) fundamental matters concerning the organization of Cabinet and National Diet
(e.g., the appointment of the Premier, the appointment and dismissal of other minis-
ters of state, the qualification examination of members of the Diet, the punishment
thereof, and the selection of chairman, vice chairman and the chairman of standing
committees) ; 2) fundamental matters concerning the operation of the Cabinet and the
Diet (e.g., the structure, decisions, agenda and voting methods at cabinet meetings,
advice and consent of the Cabinet, appointment by the Premier of acting ministers,
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passes powers explicitly conferred upon each of political departments
by the Constitution as well.
A third rationale 8 3 propounded for the political question doctrine is
based on the limitations inherent in the very nature of judicial power
and proceedings. Proponents of this theory conceive of the constitu-
tional principle of judicial supremacy as counteracted by equally im-
portant constitutional principles of popular sovereignty, of a respon-
sible Cabinet and parliamentary system. Therefore, the act of state
which is by its very nature highly political should not be determined
by the judges who do not have the same kind of political responsibility
as the other branches. Unlike the first view described above, the legal
aspects of the alleged acts of state are not regarded as being basically
of less significance in its consequences nor is it insisted that the legal
aspects should be assimilated and absorbed by the political aspects of
the problem. Rather the proponents maintain that regardless of the
feasibility of reviewing the problem, the act of state should be left
outside the purview of judicial power because of the very nature of
such an act itself. Furthermore, according to this view, it is not so
much a question of whether an act of state arises only from a consti-
tutional problem or from a statutory problem as the nature of the act
itself that makes a case an act of state. Thus this view is close to the
second view previously described in that it views the political question
as arising out of the limitation upon the principle of judicial suprem-
acy. However, proponents of this view do not give satisfactory reasons
for the alleged unsuitability of the adversary and evidentiary system
as a means of solving political questions. The statement that political
action is by its very nature "irrational" merely begs the question.
Finally, there is a theory 4 which does not necessarily favor the
quorum for sessions of National Diet, agenda, and voting methods, quorum for com-
mittees of the Diet and the like) ; 3) matters concerning negotiations between Cabinet
and Diet (e.g., convocation of sessions of Diet, dissolution of the House of Repre-
sentatives, submission to the Diet bills and other forms of drafts and modification and
withdrawal thereof) ; and 4) matters concerning the destiny of a nation as a whole
(e.g., diplomacy, orders of defensive mobilization, orders of peace keeping mobilization
and the proclamation of emergency state of affairs). When Irie's list is compared with
the summary of Tokyo District Court Judge Yoshitaka Numajiri, prepared from Japa-
nese scholars' works on the political question doctrine in France, Germany, and the
United States, it is apparent that Justice Irie's classification most clearly resembles
that of France. See Numajiri, Tchi k5i to keiji saibanken ( Political questions and
criminal jurisdiction of courts). HANREE TIMEs (No. 148) 2-7 (1963).
" Okawa, Tochi kii ron (Essay on act of state), in 68 KOKKA GAKKAI ZASSHI
(Nos. 3, 4, 9, 10) (1955), 70 KOKKA GAKKAI ZASSHI (Nos. 1, 2) (1956) ; H. Kaneko,
Tdchi kai no kenkvi-i (A study on "Gerichtsfreie Hoheitsakte"), 71 KOKKA GAKKAI
ZASSHI (Nos. 8, If (1957) : 72 KOKKA GAKKAI ZASSHI (Nos. 2, 9) (1958).
"'T. MIYAzAWA,. KEMP6 280, in 3 HORITSUGAKU ZENSHU (1960). See also his re-
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introduction of the notion of political question in Japan as it has been
practiced in the West, although it would favor excluding some acts of
government from judicial review. Even then, the proper grounds for
such an exclusion of judicial review, it is argued, are not because of the
political question per se but because of judicial incompetence to review
certain parts of the case without stepping into discretionary areas.
This method of logical construction was used by the Tokyo High
Court in the second Tomabechi case, and by Justices Okuno and Taka-
hashi, in the Sunakawa case. What this view implies is that the court
first reviews the constitutionality of laws, orders and other actions of
political departments both in a jurisdictional and substantive sense
and then opts for non-justiciability whenever there are discretionary
elements of the political branches of government involved.
Some scholars, relatively few in number, are opposed to any doc-
trine of political questions. 5 Their reasons for opposition are al-
most the same as opinions expressed by the minority group in the
Supreme Court, especially Justice Kotani in the Sunakawa case. The
opponents of the doctrine regard the provisions of Article 81 of the
Japanese Constitution as something unique and special, neither com-
parable with judicial power in Western countries nor with judicial
power under the Meiji Constitution. Where the proponents of the
doctrine seek its rationale partially in the de facto recognition of the
doctrine in many Western countries, the opponents in refutation note
that had the limitation of judicial power based on the doctrine of
political questions been inherent in the concept of judicial power, the
enactment of Article 81 specifically denies any such inherent limita-
tion. Since Article 98 of the Constitution renders null and void all
unconstitutional laws, orders or other governmental actions, some
scholars argue that the judiciary should refrain from exercising this
tremendous power to nullify governmental action. However, opponents
of the political question doctrine note that when Article 98 and 81 are
jointly analyzed, there is an obvious and express renunciation of any
political question doctrine. Unlike those who emphasize the grave and
uncontrollable consequences which may arise from a judicial restraint,
the opponents support judicial intervention because of the very nature
of the highly political action which is closely related to the basis of
national policies, arguing that because the Cabinet and the National
marks at a panel discussion on kaisan mukO Ianketsu no fukumu Mondai in JURISUTO
(No. 46) at 4-8 (1953).
' See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
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Diet have more potential power to destroy the nation, the judicial
review of their actions, particularly actions of a highly political nature,
becomes all the more important. These commentators would allow only
procedural and not political checks on the exercise of judicial power.
In the end, it must be said that Japanese scholars disagree as strongly
as Supreme Court justices over the proper role of the political question
doctrine. Its further illumination must be awaited in the years to come.
